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Abstract
Political science traditionally has either ignored biology in favor of purely environmental explanations for political phenomena or merely ruminated about the
likely role of biology, leaving data-based research on biopolitics in dangerously
short supply. Currently, attention to the apparent genetic basis for political and
social orientations holds the greatest promise of advancing empirical biopolitics.
Thus, in this essay, we orient behavior genetics research in the larger framework
of biology and politics, confront its normative implications, describe the techniques involved, assess the strengths and weaknesses of commonly employed
data and procedures, and describe the next steps in this research stream. Because
these next steps involve molecular genetic work, we provide some background
genetic information, but we mainly urge political scientists to join interdisciplinary teams so that nature and nurture can both be employed in ongoing efforts to
understand the sources of mass-scale human politics.
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Gene: a sequence of
DNA base pairs that
constitutes the basic
unit of inheritance
Neurotransmitters:
complex proteins that
are part of the nervous system and affect
behavior
Heritability: the proportion of phenotypic
variance among individuals attributable to genetic differences in that
population
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Introduction
Original empirical research connecting
biology to politics is disappointingly rare
in political science. We begin this review by
discussing work being done in cognate disciplines and by addressing the normative
reservations some political scientists seem
to harbor concerning biologically informed
research. We then provide extensive description of a technique—the classic twin
design—that has been employed by political scientists of late and that is equipped to
serve as an entry point for biology into the
research repertoire of political science, just
as it has in other disciplines. But the twin
design has limitations; therefore, later in the
essay, we describe molecular genetic work
that can be done in cooperation with geneticists to identify the precise genes and biological systems relevant to politics. We pay
particular attention to the application of
these techniques to the study of political attitudes, but we conclude with a discussion
of the way in which the incorporation of biology can enhance research in virtually every subfield of political science.
Political Science, Psychology, Economics,
and Behavior Genetics
A biological approach to political science
is hardly new. In fact, biopolitics stretches
back nearly as far as behavioral politics;
both approaches found their first enthusiastic practitioners in the behavioral revolution
of the 1960s. Some might even argue that
the pedigree of biopolitics is longer than
that of behavioralism, going back to Aristotle’s notable claim that “man is by nature
a political animal.” What is striking is that
behavioralism in political science is inextricably bound up with empirical research,
whereas biopolitics has remained largely
theoretical, descriptive, and speculative
(see, e.g., the notable work of Ira Carmen,
Bryan Jones, Roger Masters, Steven Peterson, Albert Somit, Joseph Tannenhaus, John
Wahlke, and James Q. Wilson). That must
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change if political scientists are to play any
role in the rapidly emerging synthesis of biology and the social sciences.
In terms of biological mechanism, empirical research on the biology of social behavior can be roughly divided into work that is
focused on the brain (and associated neurotransmitters) and work that is focused
on genes. Among the social sciences, psychology is notable for having developed robust research agendas in both physiological
realms. Cognitive psychology is the most
visible example of a focus on brain physiology, and the extensive research on the heritability of social traits typically is associated
with the behavior genetics research of psychologists such as Thomas Bouchard and
David Lykken. Economics has recently developed a widely publicized research focus
on the brain, evidenced by the formation of
a Society for Neuroeconomics and an associated well-attended annual meeting for the
presentation of neurocognitive economic research (for informative examples, see recent
work by Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Read
Montague, Tania Singer, and Paul Zak). To
date, however, very little research in economics has focused on genetics. In political science there has been very little of either kind of work, despite the longstanding
presence of a biopolitics subgroup within
the discipline.
The scarcity of empirical work in biopolitics may result from the fact that biopolitics has to a substantial degree followed the lead of evolutionary psychology
in focusing on the role of human genetics
and brain physiology in establishing broad
human behavioral universals, such as hierarchy, war, leadership behavior, and
sexual politics. The problem for empirical work that focuses on human universals is that these universals, by definition,
leave insufficient variation in central dependent variables. The need for variation
is not unique to empirical biopolitics, and
the frustrations of relying primarily on stochastic variation for the study of humans
are familiar to all behavioral political scientists. One exception exploited by psy-
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chologists in studying human universals
is the existence of cognitive and behavioral
abnormalities associated with selective,
naturally occurring physical damage to the
brain. This has provided advances in cognitive psychology, but any application to
political science is remote. Similarly, studies of universals in animal behavior have
recently advanced rapidly through a combination of extensive selective breeding
and the use of gene knockout and splicing
technologies. For obvious ethical reasons,
these techniques will continue to be unavailable for human behavioral research;
consequently, investigation of human genetic behavioral universals is far less accessible for empirical research and unlikely to
yield its answers quickly or easily.
Some empirical work on the biological
causes of naturally occurring variation in
politically relevant human behavior has
been conducted. In 1986, Douglas Madsen published a groundbreaking study of
the role of serotonin in dominance behavior. At virtually the same time, a team of
researchers led by Lindon Eaves and Nicholas Martin added a short battery of political and social attitude items known as
the Wilson-Patterson Inventory to a long
set of mental health, personality, and addictive behavior questions that were being presented to >60,000 respondents in
a survey of twins and their family members. Using the classic twin design, their
analysis of these data (Martin et al. 1986)
indicated that a surprisingly large portion
of variance in attitudes is traceable to genetic forces. This finding should have sent
shock waves through political science, but
instead it remained virtually unknown.
In the 20 years since, political science has
seen almost no published empirical work
that followed up on either the clear indication of a physiology of political behavior
reported by Madsen (1986) or the clear evidence of a genetic basis for political beliefs
reported by Martin et al. (1986).
In the past few years, this has begun to
change. Schrieber’s (2005) dissertation utilizing functional magnetic resonance imag-
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ing (fMRI) studies of brain activity during
political cognition provided evidence that
differences between political sophisticates
and political novices arise from their use
of different neural substrates and won the
annual political psychology award for best
dissertation. Alford et al. (2005) reanalyzed
the twin data gathered by Eaves and Martin, expanding the coverage of ideology
to include an analysis of the heritability
of party identification. Fowler et al. (2006)
conducted a twin study demonstrating the
heritability of variations in levels of political turnout. Hatemi et al. (2007c) identified the indirect connection of genetics to
vote choice. McDermott and colleagues
(Johnson et al. 2006) investigated the effects of neurotransmitter levels on play in
simulated games. Orbell et al. (2004) and
Axelrod & Hammond (2006) utilized simulations to model the implications of evolution for political variables. And studies
informed by a biological conception of political behavior, including notable publications by Ostrom (1998), Marcus (Marcus et
al. 2000), and Lodge & Taber (2005), have
found an increasingly wide audience.
We are confident that this recent, decidedly empirical variant of biopolitics will
flourish as political scientists become increasingly aware that biology does not
equate with either universalism or determinism. This is not to say that a more biological turn in political science would
come without cost. The first step is merely
educating political scientists on modern
genetic and biological theory. This re-education process strikes some political scientists as daunting, but this perception must
be fought. Previous generations of political scientists have gone outside their discipline to become conversant in first linear algebra and later calculus in order to
conduct research in behavioralism and rational choice, respectively. A comparable
commitment to the study of biology is adequate to conduct research on genetics and
politics. The standard approach in the hard
sciences includes large teams of individuals with diverse skills; methodologists,

Twin design: comparing the resemblance of
monozygotic and dizygotic twins to estimate
genetic and environmental components of
variance
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Phenotype: observed
characteristic resulting from the combined
effects of genes and
environment
Environment: all of
the context in which organisms reside
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bench geneticists, theorists, data collectors,
neuroscientists, and psychophysiologists
frequently come together to conduct biologically informed social (but to this point
rarely political) science. It is unrealistic and
unnecessary to expect political scientists to
obtain advanced degrees in biology, but
they can learn enough to converse appropriately with the hard scientists on interdisciplinary teams.
Fortunately, some of this research, notably in behavior genetics, utilizes research
skills quite familiar to traditional political
behavioralists. Paper-and-pencil surveys,
correlation analysis, and linear regression were all pioneered by Sir Francis Galton, the founding father of behavior genetics. Even today, most work in behavior
genetics, much to the dismay of “wet” geneticists, continues to focus on paper-andpencil reports and essentially correlational
statistical analysis (albeit of a far more advanced variety). Moreover, political scientists can bring to the table fascinating
questions, precise descriptions of political
phenotypes, detailed understanding of environmental influences, and a willingness
to work with scholars in the life sciences
toward the goal of producing quality empirical research that integrates genetics
and the environment to assess the fundamental links running from genes through
the brain to behavior.
A critical mass of political scientists
possessing a working knowledge of biology is necessary, but not sufficient, since
data availability would still be a concern.
In contrast to the laudable norm of data
sharing in political science—of which the
National Election Studies and the vast political science holdings at the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) are prime examples—data
sets developed within behavior genetics
have been almost exclusively viewed as
the private property of their initial principal investigators. There is no archive
for such data, and we are aware of only a
single publicly available twin study data
set that contains political or social variables. Empirical social scientists obviously
need data to move forward, and data on
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the relevance of genetics to politics are in
short supply. Fortunately, progress is being made on this front. The National Science Foundation recently awarded a grant
to a team of political scientists and behavior geneticists (John Hibbing, John Alford,
Kevin Smith, Peter Hatemi, Lindon Eaves,
Nicholas Martin, Robert Krueger, and Caroline Funk), whose detailed survey of the
political attitudes and behaviors of >1000
twins will be available for widespread
scholarly use by late 2009. This will be the
first time political scientists have unfettered access to twin studies and the first
time a twin study asks more than cursory
questions about politics (party identification, participation, and selected, dichotomous positions on issues). Additional data
sets may well be generated by other collaborative teams. Interactions between political scientists and behavior geneticists
are now under way in places as diverse as
Virginia, Minnesota, Southern California,
Canada, Sweden, and Australia.
While the practical issues discussed
above have clearly slowed the growth of
empirical biopolitics, an additional constraint has been ideological. Reaction to
work in this area frequently betokens a
visceral distaste: “Isn’t that what eugenics was all about?” or even more directly
“Isn’t that what leads to Nazi Germany?”
Exploring a link between genes and variable human traits raises a sensitive issue,
and like the public uneasiness with evolution, it must be faced directly if the social
sciences are to make any contribution to
the consilience revolution. Science is about
facts, and not just the comfortable facts—
or, even worse, the dressing up of hopeful fictions as established facts. What was
and is wrong about social eugenics and its
more extreme expression in selective genocide is that the actions taken were and are
morally wrong. Mass killing or sterilization is not wrong because it is mistaken
about genetic facts, nor does it become
right if it is based on accurate genetic facts.
The argument that establishing a genetic influence on a trait directly enables
genocide is also questionable. The science
of genetics is new. Genocide appears to be
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nearly as old as modern hominids. Serving
as the latest in a long line of excuses for inhumanity is not the same thing as being a
cause of inhumanity. Nor is it the case that
science is the final arbiter of what the public construes as facts. A plurality of adults
in the United States refuses to believe that
humans and chimps share a common ancestor, even though human speciation by
natural selection clearly qualifies as a scientific fact and even though the United States
is one of the most literate and proscience
countries in the world. Although we regret
the tendency of many to want to hide from
the possibility of a role for genes in explaining human behavioral differences, we are
not surprised by either the belief itself or
its emotional intensity and tenacity in the
face of empirical evidence. We believe that
some people are genetically predisposed
to cognitive structures that make the biology of human behavior in whatever form
discomforting (“after all, biology is what
makes animals animals but it is clearly
something beyond biology that makes humans humans”) whereas others are genetically predisposed to cognitive structures
that leave them wondering what all the
fuss is about (“after all, we are just slightly
less hairy bonobos, are we not?”).
An Example of Empirical Biopolitics:
The Classic Twin Design
It is important to move beyond mere assessment of the role of genetics to explication of the nature of that role, but, as discussed above, for the near future the most
accessible data for the empirical study of
biology and politics will come from classic
twin studies. As data become more widely
accessible and interaction with behavior geneticists increases, political scientists will
need at least a rudimentary sense of the design, logic, and pitfalls of the twin design, if
only to be reasonably informed consumers.
What follows is a brief synopsis—with citations to more in-depth coverage for those
who wish to be more than consumers.
Behavior geneticists typically divide influences on an individual trait, whether it
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is a political attitude or a physical characteristic, into two broad groups—heredity
(H) and environment (E). The total variation in a trait can thus be represented as
the sum H + E. Heredity is the impact of
genetic inheritance on trait variation. In
the case of a physical characteristic such as
adult height, this would be the proportion
of the total variation in height across individuals that is due to the variation across
individuals in the multiple genes that control height. For any one individual, the
source of this genetic influence is relatively well defined, as on average 50% of
our genes come from our mother and 50%
come from our father. This leads to the fact
that biological children of tall parents are
more likely to be tall than are the biological children of short parents, although
even for a relatively straightforward additive physical trait such as height, the relationship is far from determinative.
Environment includes all of the nongenetic external factors that influence trait
variation across a population. These influences range broadly from the earliest biological environment of the womb,
to the physical environment of a childhood house, to the social environment of
the adult workplace. In the case of adult
height, some of the obvious environmental factors are prenatal nutrition, the adequacy of childhood and adolescent diet,
and exposure to chemical agents that can
inhibit growth. Environmental influences
can be divided further into two subcategories: the shared environment and the unshared, or unique, environment.
Shared environment is all of the shared
external influences that we would typically think of as leading to trait similarity
between individuals. Siblings, for example, might share similar childhood environments, including similar parental interactions, a similar physical environment,
and similar nutrition. If the siblings happen to be twins, they would also share a
more similar prenatal environment. In the
case of adult height, a shared environmental factor, such as a regional diet limited in
protein and specific nutrients, could lead
to similarity in height across the entire
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MZ: monozygotic
(“identical”) twins
DZ: dizygotic (“fraternal”) twins
Equal environments
assumption: in twin
studies, the assumption that environments
are equally similar for
monozygotic and for dizygotic twins
Allele: the specific version of a gene
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population of a region (e.g., North Korea).
The unshared environment, in contrast, is
composed of all the distinctive external influences that we would typically think of
as leading to trait dissimilarity across individuals. Although much of the early childhood environment, for example, is similar
across siblings, much is nonetheless variable. Siblings differ in diet, disease exposure, peer influences, and a host of other
experiences. With the shift to adult life, the
share of unique influences on siblings increases sharply, as peer, workplace, family, and physical settings typically diverge.
Thus, the tools of behavior geneticists offer a method for estimating not only the
degree of heritability but also the relative
contributions of different components of
the environment.
The leverage to accomplish these important feats is provided by the existence
of two fundamentally different types of
twin pairs, one type genetically identical
and the other sharing just 50% of their genetic heritage. Twins provide a powerful “natural experiment” by introducing
known genetic variation into analyses of
the sources of trait variability. Observing
the political similarity of parents and children, as is common in political science research, does not offer this same leverage
because all nonadopted children share 50%
of their genetic heritage with each biological parent. By shifting the focus from the
similarity between parents and offspring
to the similarity between twins, researchers can take advantage of the fact that
twins vary in known ways in the degree
of their genetic correlation. This variance
in genetic similarity derives from the existence of two distinct types of twins: monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ). MZ (frequently but imprecisely called identical)
twins develop from a single egg fertilized
by a single sperm, and they share an identical genetic code. DZ (frequently but erroneously called fraternal) twins develop
from two separate eggs fertilized by two
separate sperm; they are in effect simply
two siblings who happen to be born nearly
simultaneously. As such, DZ twins share
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on average 50% of genetic material, the
same amount as any other pair of biological siblings.
The classic twin design is built on the
assumption that the effect of genetics is
measurably distinct for MZ and DZ twins,
whereas the effect of the environment is
equivalent or at least randomly distributed
around equivalence. This crucial equal-environments assumption is open to challenge. If, compared to DZ twins, MZ twins
not only share more genetic alleles but also
share more environmental experiences,
attributing the differences between MZ
and DZ twins to heritability would overestimate the effects of genetics. Thus, the
equal-environments assumption has been
subjected to sustained and varied investigation. We do not review this extensive
literature here (for more information, see
Scarr & Carter-Saltzman 1979; Bouchard et
al. 1990; Plomin 1990; Kendler et al. 1993;
Plomin et al. 2001; Bouchard & McGue
2003; Horwitz et al. 2003; Richardson &
Norgate 2005; Hatemi 2007, ch. 3; Charney
2008), but the central conclusion of empirical research is that violations of the equalenvironments assumption are limited and
often inconsequential.
Given the genetic differences and environmental similarities of the two types
of twins, for any trait that is partly heritable, the tendency for MZ twins to share
that characteristic should be stronger than
the tendency for DZ twins to share that
characteristic. In contrast, characteristics
that arise purely from the environment,
whether shared by the twins (as would
typically be the case for parental socialization) or not shared by the twins (as would
be the case for many adult experiences),
should not generate any significantly different patterns when we contrast MZ and
DZ twins (see Eaves et al. 1989, 1997; Plomin et al. 2001 for thorough discussions of
the relevant statistical techniques). This is
the basic and powerful concept behind the
classic twin design.
Rudimentary assessment of the role of
genetics is possible by subtracting the correlation for DZ pairs from the correlation
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for MZ pairs and then doubling the difference (since the genetic similarity of MZ
twins is twice that of DZ twins). Shared
environment can be estimated by doubling the correlation for DZ pairs and then
subtracting the correlation for MZ pairs.
Unshared environment is generally considered to be the remainder (1 – MZ), although it is important to note that this figure actually includes the effect of unshared
environment as well as the error term. But
the preferred methodology for estimating
effects involves structural equation models. State-of-the-art analyses employ Cholesky decomposition techniques, which,
unlike the old polychoric correlation procedures, make it possible to provide significance tests, to account for mediating
variables, and to engage in model testing
and subsequent re-estimation of the relationships once the proper model has been
identified (Hatemi 2007, ch. 3). The typical
designation in these structural equation
models is A for (additive) genetics, C for
shared or common environment, and E for
unshared environment. Other models add
a D term for interactive genetic effects. Still
further elaborations on these basic models
are possible and increasingly common.
How Can Genes Possibly Influence Lifelong Temperaments?
As mentioned, the classic twin design
produces useful indications of a genetic influence on political attitudes but no sense
of the processes that produce this connection. In this regard, the work of psychologists on the heritability of personality can
serve as a template. In many ways, the concerns of psychology with enduring temperaments mirror those of political science,
and both “personality” and “political ideology” (the phrase political scientists apply to a cohesive collection of attitudes on
issues) enjoyed early prominence among
behavioralists in their respective disciplines. But evidence of a heritable component of personality is more generally acknowledged than is the case for ideology,
and research to explicate this relationship
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in psychology has moved far ahead of research in political science.
The evidence that personality is partly
heritable is overwhelming. Taking the
means of several estimates of the heritability of the “Big Five” personality traits suggests that extraversion has a heritability
coefficient of around 0.53, agreeableness
0.42, conscientiousness 0.46, emotional stability or neuroticism 0.49, and openness or
curiosity 0.54 (computed from results collected by Bouchard & McGue 2003, p. 23).
The heritability of personality traits has
even been observed in animal experiments,
a context where environmental controls
are possible to a much greater extent than
with humans. For example, researchers
have found that extraverted bird parents
tend to have extraverted offspring even
when those offspring have never seen their
parents. Moreover, selective breeding over
just three or four generations can produce
significantly bolder or shyer birds (Drent
et al. 2003; for a summary, see Gosling &
John 1999). The notion that extraversion is
genetic in birds but not in humans, even
though many of the same neurotransmitters relevant to extraversion (such as serotonin and dopamine) are present in both
birds and humans, stretches credulity.
Progress has been made in the next step
of identifying the specific genes that are
relevant to variations in personality traits.
The best-known work involving human
temperament is centered on serotonin, a
neurotransmitter long known for its connection to assertiveness on the one hand
and certain types of depression on the
other. Allelic variation in a gene known as
5-HTT, which is associated with the reuptake of serotonin from synapses (thus affecting the availability of usable serotonin)
has been associated with depressive behavior, especially if allelic variation is interacted with previous environmental experiences such as an abusive childhood
(Caspi et al. 2003). In fact, a whole class
of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs), including Prozac, has grown up
around the connection of serotonin transport to social behavior. To be sure, some
results on the specific genes involved with
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personality have not been replicated, and
confusion is often apparent (van Gestel &
van Broeckhoven 2003); but social behavior is amazingly complex, and research in
this area is only beginning to gain momentum. It will take time to establish the details, but few if any scientists would insist
that neurotransmitters such as serotonin,
dopamine, vasopressin, and oxytocin are
irrelevant to personality, and equally few
would claim that the manufacture, transport, and reception of these neurotransmitters has no basis whatsoever in genetics.
What remains is the difficult but exciting
work of connecting genes to behavior, a
connection that involves the interaction of
thousands of genes, not to mention further
interactions of those genes with environmental triggers and modifiers.
So the personality traits that play such
a crucial role in psychology have been established as partially genetic, and work
is well under way in specifying the genes
that are relevant and the particular alleles
predisposing an individual toward either
risk-taking or extreme caution, buoyancy
or despondence. Research in this area is an
increasingly important part of psychology,
and laypeople do not tend to have much
difficulty accepting that personal temperament is partially rooted in genetics. Personality traits seem to be relatively permanent and also to directly involve behaviors.
Those who are extraverted tend to behave
differently at parties than those who are
introverted, and they tend to do so at all
stages of life. Reactions to personal situations, including fear and empathy, seem
spontaneous and emotionally powerful,
just as might be expected if their basis is
in the chemicals flowing through various
components of the limbic system. In short,
the intense, immediate reactions to events
in people’s personal lives make it relatively easy to accept that genes could play
an important role in shaping personality,
pushing some people toward hair-trigger
tempers and others toward diffidence in
the face of affronts.
Political temperament is an obvious political parallel to personality, but there are
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also some important distinctions. After
all, it is often asserted that personality involves behavior whereas political and social attitudes are just that—attitudes. They
can be characterized as preferences for the
manner in which group life should be conducted. At first blush, these preferences
seem distinct from the heavily emotive,
behavior-inducing features of personality. Compared to personal temperament,
political attitudes are more cognitive and
less limbic, are they not? They are highly
changeable and subject to life’s vicissitudes, are they not? They are subscribed
to casually and only peripheral to the core
of our being, are they not? If these are accurate perceptions of political attitudes, it
makes sense to conceptualize and to study
them the way political scientists have done
for decades: as purely environmentally
contingent epiphenomena. Seen from this
vantage point, it is unsurprising and even
sensible that political scientists would have
turned to behavioralism to understand the
source of political attitudes.
But this view of political attitudes is
built on intuition rather than science. Attitudes may feel as though they are cognitive
responses to our experiences and, moreover, we may be more comfortable believing that our political attitudes are the rational consequences of our individualized
environment, but feelings and desires are
not the crux of the matter. Is there evidence
that neurotransmitters, emotions, chemicals, and genetics are irrelevant to political
temperament? The answer is no, and upon
closer reflection, the basis for positing a major difference between the personal and the
political begins to crumble.
Any assertion that politics is devoid of
emotion is inconsistent with even casual
observation of the political world. Just as
some people respond emotively to personal events whereas others are more laconic, similar distinctions are clearly evident in the political world, where the
politically intense reside cheek by jowl
with political apathetics. Fascinating recent work has been done on the extent to
which emotional reactions characterize
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people’s response to political stimuli (Marcus et al. 2000, Lodge & Taber 2005, Schreiber 2005, Westen et al. 2006). Attitudes
on individual political issues may vary
substantially over the course of a lifetime
(see Fiorina 1981), but ideological frameworks are more consistent over time, and
there may be even more stability when it
comes to positions on bedrock principles
concerning the organization of group life
(attitudes toward out-groups, toward punishment of norm violators, toward reproductive matters, and toward the nature of
the human condition).
Though it is unquestionably true that
attitudes toward mass-scale politics are,
from an evolutionary point of view, quite
recent, this does not mean that a deeper,
even genetic basis is impossible. Reading and writing have been practiced by a
significant portion of the world’s population for only a few generations, yet specific
genes have been identified that correlate
with reading performance. Quite probably, the cognitively novel processes involved with reading and writing coopted
biological systems that originally evolved
for other purposes, but this does not obviate the fact that individuals with a particular allele on chromosome 6 are more likely
to suffer from dyslexia. Genes can matter
even when adaptation for the trait of interest is not involved. This is true of reading
and it is likely true of politics.
Even so, one reason political scientists
have been slow to accept biological evidence may be that they study an evolutionarily recent and uniquely human subject:
mass-scale politics. Animal corollaries for
all kinds of social behaviors can be found,
most obviously among higher-order primates (see de Waal 1982, 1996) but also in
the insect world (Wilson 1975, Whitfield et
al. 2003, Robinson 2004), and although these
social behaviors are sometimes referred to
as political—especially when they involve
dominance hierarchies and collective decisions—they are quite distinct from massscale politics. Nonhuman animals never
cease to surprise, but there is no existing evidence that any species other than Homo sa-
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piens cares about social norms, rules, and
behaviors when the consequences of these
norms, rules, and behaviors do not affect
the organism’s immediate bailiwick. Humans’ ability to engage in abstract thought
has created an interesting situation, but the
fact that a thought is abstract does not mean
people have only weak attachment to it.
If the recent revolution in neuroscience
has taught us anything, it is that activity by
the cortex does not override limbic activity but is integrated with it (LeDoux 1996,
2002). Politics, therefore, contrary to the instincts of laypeople and to the untested assumptions of political scientists, is certainly
a likely candidate for being shaped in part
by limbic activity, which in turn is known
to be shaped by genes. Moreover, the notion that the cortex is the only part of human anatomy not subject to the laws of evolution is badly mistaken. Recent research
indicates that even the most unemotional
of decisions, such as whether two digits
should be added or subtracted, sets off distinct brain activation patterns (Haynes et al.
2007). It appears that subtle, nonemotional
decisions have biological markers, and if
they have biological markers, they may also
have genetic correlates. Not all cortices are
born equal, and genes are undoubtedly relevant to these variations.
Political scientists’ belief that politics
is sui generis is both right and wrong. It is
right in the sense that mass-scale politics is
evolutionarily recent and uniquely human,
but it is wrong in the sense that politics is
generated by essentially the same brain
and the same genome that existed prior to
the advent of mass-scale social life. Recent
evidence indicates that positive genetic
selection does not need the hundreds of
thousands of years that were once thought
to be necessary (Rockman et al. 2005), but
the hypothesis that existing machinery has
been expropriated for shifting situations
over the past 5000–10,000 years remains
more likely than that completely original
neural/biological machinery evolved during that timespan.
The ability of genes to affect political beliefs is easier to understand with some ap-
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preciation of modern genetics. When analyzing his sweet peas, Mendel happened
to select traits (such as whether the flowers were purple or white and whether the
seeds were wrinkled or smooth) that are
both monogenic and largely oblivious to
common environmental forces. This was
fortuitous in terms of establishing the basic
building blocks of genetics but unfortunate
in that most traits, and certainly most complex behavioral traits, are polygenic and
heavily contingent on the environment. If
a political scientist’s knowledge of genetics
ends with Mendel, that scholar will expect
all genetic forces to be gross, deterministic, and dichotomous, and it would be impossible to reconcile genetics with the gradated, changeable, and environmentally
shaped world of political attitudes.
A working knowledge of post-Mendelian genetics helps to reconcile the political and the biological. Important individual genes such as 5-HTT, which is among
the most studied in the entire human genome, at best account for 3%–4% of the
variance in depressive tendencies (Caspi et
al. 2003). Many, many genes are involved
in serotonin production, transport, and reception—and serotonin is just one of many
neurotransmitters relevant to depression.
The correlation of genes with behavioral
traits is much more likely to be detected if
genes are permitted to interact with dozens of other genes (Comings et al. 2000).
Complex traits tend to be configural rather
than additive to the point that many genetically based traits (such as genius) do not
even run in families (Lykken 1998). Moreover, all these genes, as well as the configurations of which they are a part, interact
with environmental forces to shape phenotypes such as obesity, schizophrenia,
conscientiousness, and political attitudes.
Geneticists do not use terms such as “determinism” or “a gene for…” because that
is not how genetics works.
The individuals most resistant to the role
of genetics in social behavior seem to be
those with the most misconceptions about
genetics. Accepting a role for genetics does
not require acceptance of the notion that all
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people are inherently violent (Ardrey 1961)
or, alternatively, that all people are peaceful and only made violent by societal forces
(Mead 1928; Rousseau 1946 [1762]). As evolutionary psychologists are quick to point
out, within species, evolution often has a
homogenizing effect as adaptive alleles
drive out nonadaptive ones, but within-species morphs are common, and substantial
variation, especially in those traits that are
not directly and immediately connected to
survival and reproduction, is likely. Important polymorphisms are scattered throughout the genome, and, after long ballyhooing
the misleading fact that a high percentage
of genes are identical across all humans and
even across all higher-order primates, recent biological research has now come to
emphasize the extent and importance of
those portions of the genome that do vary
from person to person and from chimp to
person (Hinds et al. 2006). Genes vary and
people vary. Some people are more prone
to violence than others, and this variability
does nothing to diminish the role of genetics in explaining human behavior—quite
the contrary.
Genes do not demand bimodal distributions in which some people are violent
and others peaceful. The more genes that
are involved in shaping a phenotype, the
more continuous and normally distributed
that phenotype will be. Contrast eye color
and height. Although there are important
exceptions (mostly green or gray), most
people have either brown or blue eyes. Eye
color is influenced by a very small number
of genes, and the result is a non-normally
distributed phenotype. The same cannot
be said for height, a trait that is known to
be influenced by an extremely large number of genes. Most people are of middling
height, and a much smaller number are
either extremely tall or extremely short.
Complex social traits, including political attitudes, are polygenic and therefore
closer to the continuous world of height
than the quasi-digital world of eye color.
Subtle variation in political attitudes from
one person to another is not a sign that genetics is irrelevant to political attitudes.
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Genes work probabilistically. To take one
example, the so-called breast cancer gene
does not mean every person with a specific
allele at that genetic locus will get breast
cancer—only that the odds of contracting
breast cancer are increased by the possession of that allele.
One important reason for variations
in behavior involves “promoter” regions
that are just upstream from the proteincoding gene. Identical genes with different promoter regions will yield fundamentally different behavioral patterns because
the differential sensitivity of promoter regions will lead the relevant gene to be expressed under different circumstances.
Polymorphisms in these promoter regions
are crucial to the behavioral variations that
interest social scientists. A certain environment, such as a vigorous political discussion, may stimulate one person but leave
another nonplussed and a third disgusted,
even as other situations could trigger different response patterns. Promoter regions
are quite likely involved in this behavioral
variation.
Finally, given the important role postMendelian genetics grants to the environment, the fact that political attitudes sometimes change over the course of a person’s
lifetime is not at all inconsistent with a potential role for genetics. Genes leave plenty
of room for a shifting environment (or developmental stages) to change phenotypic
behavior. The only determinists in the
world today are environmental determinists. Geneticists go out of their way to point
out that the alleged contrast between nature and nurture is in actuality a chimera.
Nature interacts with nurture to make us
who we are. Geneticists believe phenotypes—both physical and behavioral—are
the result of G × E interactions (genetics
interacting with environment). Traditional
social scientists, unfortunately, cling to
the belief that behavioral phenotypes are
the result of E alone, a notion totally without empirical foundation and increasingly
anachronistic, even embarrassing.
But the fault does not lie entirely with
political scientists. Behavior genetics is a
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more insular field than it should be, with
close alliances primarily to those social scientists working on mental disorders and
addictive behavior—not coincidentally, areas that generate substantial support from
funding sources. Data sets therefore rarely
contain extensive information on political
attitudes or behaviors, and they are typically proprietary and not widely disseminated. The few articles presenting evidence
of a genetic influence on political and social attitudes tend to be atheoretical, with
little in the way of explanation for how
and why genes are relevant to politics—
explanation that is probably necessary if
political scientists are to be persuaded.
Alternatives to the Classic Twin Design
The twin design remains the workhorse
of behavior genetics, thanks to known differences between MZ and DZ twins in degree of genetic similarity, but other designs
have grown in usage. Adoption studies, for
example, make it possible to compare siblings who share 50% of their genetic heritage (nonadoptive siblings) and those who
share 0% (adoptive siblings), or to compare children with their adoptive as well
as their biological parents. Both techniques
have been used to good effect, although
information on biological parents is often
difficult to acquire. However, adoption
studies in the area of political attitudes
are virtually nonexistent and thus constitute a fertile area for future research—with
the caveat that such studies will be best
when they involve adults. Twin research
indicates that the heritability of political
views does not become apparent until after age 20, when preferences begin to firm
up (Bouchard & McGue 2003).
More progress has been made regarding
a different approach to adding variation
in genetic similarity: the extended-family
model. When information is collected not
only on twins but also on their parents, siblings, and perhaps other relatives, statistical power is increased and several corrections are possible (see Hatemi et al. 2007a).

Locus: location in the
genome
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Incorporating data from nontwin siblings
and other relatives permits more accurate
assessment of the environment (since nontwin siblings presumably have roughly
similar environments to their twin siblings
once age corrections are applied), so data
on the extended family, particularly when
analyzed with the sophisticated structural
equation modeling techniques now common in behavior genetics, have the potential to extend understanding of the relationship between genetics and political
attitudes.
The techniques of behavior genetics,
from simple correlations comparing the
similarity of MZ and DZ twins to more
complex structural equation models, are
not completely foreign to those scholars familiar with the statistical techniques
commonly used in political science. In this
sense, detailed political data on twins constitute a valuable entry gate for political
scientists eager to begin to apply the insights of biology to research on politics.
No immersion in the details of molecular
genetics is required, and with fairly minimal background work, it will be possible
for many political scientists to confirm, extend, or modify existing, preliminary findings on the degree to which political attitudes (and behaviors) are influenced by
genetic factors as opposed to either shared
or unshared environmental forces.
Although this situation makes twin
studies incredibly valuable, they have their
limits. The real problem with twin studies
is not the equal-environments assumption
but the fact that they provide no information on the identity of the specific genes or
biological systems leading to a given phenotype. It is one thing to know that a given
phenotype is roughly 45% heritable; it is
quite another to know the specific genes
involved, the association of these genes’
various alleles with phenotypic manifestations, and the biological explanations for
that association of alleles and phenotype.
For this reason, research on genetics and
politics cannot stop with assessments of
heritability of the sort possible with twin
studies and related procedures. Instead,
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DNA samples must be obtained so that information on specific alleles at candidate
loci is available. Variation in these alleles
is then assessed for correlation with phenotypes of interest in what is usually referred to as an association study.
For example, thanks to the availability
of DNA samples drawn earlier on thousands of subjects in Australia, we have begun the process of determining if allelic
variations in genes known to be involved
with standard neurotransmitter systems,
including the serotonin transport gene discussed above (5-HTT), are associated with
variations in political beliefs. Twin studies
are still viewed with suspicion by many in
the social sciences, but if associations are
found between variations in individual
genes and political beliefs, it will be much
more difficult for environmental determinists to make their case. Although this type
of bench genetic work requires more scientific background than twin studies do, the
rapidly decreasing cost of genetic analysis
and the possibility of teaming up with geneticists make this kind of research feasible for political scientists.
Allelic association studies require a priori, theoretically based knowledge of a locus suspected of being politically relevant.
It is the allelic variation at this locus, after all, that is checked for correlation with
phenotypic behavior. If, however, politics
is genetic but driven by something other
than the usual chemical suspects (e.g., serotonin and dopamine), steps must be
taken to identify the novel loci. Since largescale political behavior is not the same as
small-scale social behavior, there is good
reason to think that political phenotypes
may be traceable to loci other than those
connected to traditional personal temperaments. In such a situation, linkage analysis
is advised. Linkage analysis takes advantage of the rapidly growing knowledge of
the human genome. Thousands of marker
alleles have been identified throughout
the billions of nucleotide base pairs found
in the chromosomes in each of our cells.
These markers are checked for cosegregation with a trait of interest (e.g., intense
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political feelings). This is done not because
these marker alleles are thought to cause
the phenotype (this would be a wild coincidence) but because, owing to patterns
of genetic recombination, seemingly unrelated traits may cosegregate simply because genes relevant to those traits are located in close proximity on our DNA. The
closer two genes are, the more likely they
are to vary together. By analyzing these
patterns of cosegregation, it is possible to
narrow the likely location of alleles relevant to the phenotype of interest.
In a perfect world, twin studies indicate
that a phenotypic trait is indeed partially
genetic and that, therefore, additional
analysis is advisable; linkage analysis is
then employed to narrow the range of possible locations for relevant genes; and finally association studies determine the
specific alleles at those targeted locations
that seem to be associated with the phenotypic behaviors of interest in the first
place. Of course, such an orderly progression rarely comes to pass, but it at least
helps to illustrate the divergent strengths
of twin studies, linkage analysis, and association studies.
In political science, the ultimate goal is
not to engage in some sort of gene therapy
in order to push everyone toward a certain political ideology but rather simply
to understand the factors that shape political attitudes and behaviors. Identifying the
genes and alleles involved is one means
toward the end of understanding these
larger biological processes. In this sense,
locating genes is not much more than a
helpful step on the road to understanding
the biological explanation for politically
relevant predispositions. Accordingly, one
goal of our research group, consistent with
a larger movement in political psychology,
is to understand the psychophysiology of
politics. Do liberals and conservatives have
different physiological reactions to political stimuli? Do they have different physiological reactions to nonpolitical stimuli?
Can the ideological leanings of individuals
be predicted merely by measuring (or manipulating) chemicals in the body?
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Integrating Political Science
Political scientists’ recent exposure to a
possible role of genetics in shaping political
attitudes as well as other political traits has
yet to significantly alter the basic thrust of
their empirical research. To this point, the
topic has been treated as a curiosity. This
is understandable, but it is important to
move to the next step, where serious tests
of serious hypotheses are performed by a
broad spectrum of scholars. Sets of genes
could affect politics in so many different
ways. There could be genes pushing individuals toward being intensely political or
indifferent to politics. Genes could influence certain individuals to possess views
traditionally associated with the political right (i.e., wariness of out-groups and
devotion to established, unchanging values) and others to possess views traditionally associated with the political left. Certain suites of genes might encourage some
people to rebel against their political environment and others to absorb the precise
political timbre of the world around them.
Then again, there may be some genes that
predispose individuals toward certain sets
of beliefs. Maybe those with alleles that
yield more usable testosterone are more
likely to adopt libertarian beliefs (“I will
not be led”), and maybe those with alleles
that yield more oxytocin—which has been
associated with trusting behavior (Kosfeld et al. 2005)—are more likely to join
groups or to support redistributive policies. Maybe only a fraction of the population is genetically predisposed one way or
the other and the remainder of the population is shaped exclusively by environmental forces. Maybe only certain types of political variables are influenced by genetics.
For example, our earlier research found
that party identification was almost completely driven by environmental forces, a
finding that has been confirmed by subsequent research (PK Hatemi, LJ Eaves, SE
Medland, KL Morley, NG Martin, unpublished manuscript). Other research by Hatemi reveals that vote choice is heritable,
but largely indirectly, through attitudes to-
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ward issues (Hatemi et al. 2007b). These
findings are perfectly consistent with a genetic explanation because the political parties and candidates present in a particular
country at a particular time are ephemeral, whereas opinions on matters relating
to the organization of group life are relatively timeless.
This budding research agenda in political genetics fits nicely with revived interest in political ideology as something more
than political scientists’ traditional conception; that is, more than just a set of specific
issue-beliefs that fit together or the ability
to identify currently employed ideological terms such as liberal or conservative
(Converse 1964). Ideology should instead
be seen as a set of bedrock predispositions
toward group life, regardless of when or
where the group exists (Jost 2006). The literature connecting personality and political beliefs is extensive and controversial
(Adorno et al. 1950; McClosky 1958; Altemeyer 1981, 1996; Caprara et al. 1999; Jost
et al. 2003; Caprara et al. 2006; Block &
Block 2005), partially because much of it
seems to paint one ideology (conservatism)
in a bad light. If personal temperament
and political temperament are both partially genetic, the natural question becomes
whether they both spring from the same
biological systems and ultimately from the
same genes. An alternative possibility is
that the manner in which people organize
and conduct their personal lives is distinct
from their preferences for the organization
and conduct of mass-scale group life—that
is, politics. The larger point is that determining the actual route connecting genes
and politics will take a good deal of work
and a willingness of additional political
scientists to avail themselves of improved
methodologies and improved data to identify the ultimate sources of political beliefs
(for an outline of such a research agenda,
see Carmen 2007).
Much of who we are as human beings
is shaped by genetics. Traits such as height
and weight, personality, mental health, occupational satisfaction, addictive behaviors, religious beliefs, and political and

of

P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e 11 (2008)

social attitudes have all been found to be
heritable, though of course at different levels. A recent Danish study put the genetic
contribution of height at 0.81 for females
and 0.69 for males; body fat at 0.59 for females and 0.63 for males; and waist circumference at 0.48 for females and 0.61 for
males (Schousboe et al. 2004). Bouchard
& McGue’s (2003) compilation of several twin studies suggests the heritability
of general intelligence to be around 0.50,
with some estimates as high as 0.70. They
also report that perceptual speed and accuracy seem to be somewhat more heritable (0.64) than verbal ability (0.48) and
memory (also 0.48). As alluded to earlier,
personality traits such as those constituting the Big Five tend to be heritable in the
range of 0.4–0.5. A study by McCourt et
al. (1999) finds right-wing authoritarianism to be heritable at approximately the
same level as each of the Big Five traits.
Similar to party affiliation, religious affiliation yields a heritability coefficient that
approaches zero. Affiliation with a group
is not genetic but the degree of religiosity
(as measured by frequency of church attendance) is strongly heritable, perhaps as
much as 0.42 (Maes et al. 1999). Specific religious beliefs, such as Sabbath observance
and accepting the Bible as truth, range in
heritability from 0.25 to 0.35 (Martin et al.
1986). The extent to which people have interests that are artistic (0.44), social (0.50),
enterprising (0.52), conventional (0.54),
and realistic (0.58) is also solidly heritable,
at least as measured by the traditional Falconer method employing twins reared together (Betsworth et al. 1994). BachnerMelman et al. (2005) have even found an
association between specific alleles (relevant to the vasopressin and serotonin systems) and interest in creative dance, on the
one hand, as opposed to more traditional
athletics on the other.
The precise figures mentioned above
should be treated with caution, but the fact
is an extraordinary range of human traits
have a basis in genetics. Of most interest
to political scientists is that social and political attitudes are included in this range
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and are about as heritable as most standard
personality traits. And the same may be
true for social and political behaviors. Recent research (Fowler et al. 2006) indicates
that actual voter turnout (not just self-reported turnout) is strongly heritable. Research under way should determine the
extent to which other political behaviors,
such as discussing politics, working in
campaigns, and joining organizations, are
heritable. Regarding social as opposed to
purely political behavior, self-reported altruism is heritable (see Rushton et al. 1986),
and ongoing research should indicate if actual altruism—as well as tendencies toward
taking risks, deferring gratification, and engaging in altruistic punishment, as measured by behavior in economic games—is
heritable. Given the range of traits that are
heritable, it would be surprising if these social and political behaviors are not heritable as well (Baschetti 2007). The real question pertains to the biological basis for this
established heritability.
Implications
Specifying the degree to which various
political concepts are heritable has important implications for virtually all subfields
of political science. Obviously, for those
who study individual-level political behavior, understanding the source of behaviors as well as the attitudes on which those
behaviors are presumably based will matter a good deal. Attitudes that are heritable have been shown to be more resistant
to change, to be held more strongly, and
to be more likely a basis for the choices we
make (see Tesser 1993). Knowing the types
of issues that tend to generate heritable attitudes, therefore, will help to explain variations across those attitudes in the extent to
which they are salient or not, intensely held
or not, easy or hard (see Carmines & Stimson 1980). It will also broaden perspective
on the source of politics. Whereas previously the debate tended to be whether various features were socialized early or acquired late, the issue now becomes whether
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features are inherited, socialized, or influenced by unique features of the environment. Incorporating genetics will indicate
the areas where the socialization efforts of
parents are and are not likely to pay off.
These individual-level implications for
students of political behavior are fairly obvious. Less obvious but no less noteworthy
are the potential implications for students
of institutions, rational choice, international
relations, and comparative politics. Determination of the degree to which, as well as
the manner by which, genetics shapes politics would allow institutionalists a better
feel for the conditions under which institutions can shape politics. The creation of
institutions is an attempt to alter the environment. Add a constable to chaos and behavior will be modified. Recognizing that
genetic predispositions will lead some people to react differently than others in the
face of the same institution has the potential to allow institutional designers to finetune their work in hopes of achieving a
better result—or at least suggests the difficulties of successful institutional design.
Given genetic diversity, it is fair to conclude that one size does not fit all.
Rational choice scholars know that individuals have different preferences for
avoiding risks, for experiencing new
things, for trying to persuade others to
change their preferences, and perhaps for
substantive matters such as a deep suspicion of out-groups or the promotion of unchanging traditional values. The assumption that preferences are merely a rational
reflection of the individual’s situation is
highly questionable, and the assumption
that preferences can be inferred from behavior leads in an endless circle. With the
recognition of genetics as a source of preferences, both of those assumptions become
unnecessary.
With regard to international relations,
conflict can be seen as arising not just because of environmental factors but also
from varying innate predispositions on the
part of the potential combatants. Adopting
a biological orientation does not require
adopting the belief that all humans are in-
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herently violent or, conversely, inherently
peaceful (for explication, see Sapolsky
2006); such claims are badly misguided.
Traits such as a proclivity toward violence
vary dramatically from person to person,
from context to context, and from gene
pool to gene pool. Some people are more
violent than others. This is true of their
tendency toward violence in their personal
lives (e.g., getting involved in a bar fight)
as well as of their tendency to advocate
collective violence against an out-group
(e.g., starting or supporting a war fought
by others). Interestingly, the correlation
between these two different orientations to
violence may be quite weak.
Comparative politics could be greatly
assisted by recognition of the fact that
groups of people are genetically distinct
from other groups of people. To provide a
concrete illustration, we reference diversity
of an important gene in the dopaminergic system. Imbalances in the neurotransmitter dopamine have been implicated in
Parkinson’s disease as well as in several
behaviors including novelty-seeking. The
relevant gene is called DRD4 because it is
instrumental in laying down the D4 class
of dopamine receptors. An insufficient
supply of these receptors would minimize
the effect of any dopamine that is present,
since all the dopamine in the world will
not matter to a biological system incapable
of receiving that dopamine. Previous work
has found evidence that, compared to
those with short alleles, individuals with
one or two long alleles of DRD4 are more
likely to exhibit risk-taking behavior, display behavior, and perhaps attention deficit disorder (Chen et al. 1999, Harpending & Cochran 2002, Ding et al. 2002).
There is substantial variation from group
to group in the presence of these long alleles (defined here as at least seven repeats
of a key 48-nucleotide base-pair sequence
in exon III). Data on the frequency of long
alleles have been reported for 39 different
groups (Chen et al. 1999) and range from
a high of 78% for the Ticuna and Guahibo
peoples of Colombia to a low of 4% for the
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Atayal of Taiwan, followed closely by the
Han (China) and Samoans, both at just 5%.
Continent-by-continent breakdowns reveal
interesting patterns. African and European groups are on average quite similar,
with the four African groups in the sample (the Biaka, the Mbuti, the San, and the
Bantu) averaging 21% long alleles and the
five European groups (Sardinians, Danes,
Swedes, Spaniards, and a mixed European
sample from the United States) averaging
15%. Some African groups, such as the San,
have fewer long alleles (9%) than some European groups, such as the Swedes (19%).
But the biggest variations can be seen between the East Asian groups, with a mean
of 9% (just 6% if the Malay are excluded),
and the South American groups, with a
mean of 69%.
These allelic differences across groups
are immense and we can say with confidence that they are not coincidental. Certain groups are genetically different from
other groups. Although such a statement
may elicit gasps in some quarters, it is far
from surprising; any time breeding populations are kept separate for numerous
generations, differences will be evident.
The obvious question of interest is whether
this undeniable genetic variation across
groups has any influence at all on group
behavior. Given that research in this area
is normatively charged, we should state
clearly that we are not claiming that the Ticuna and Atayal people behave differently
because of genetic differences. Genes are
expressed differently in different environmental contexts, so once contextual factors
are introduced, these sizable genetic differences may very well be completely irrelevant to behavior. But they may also be relevant, and to deny this possibility simply
because we do not want it to be true alters
the status of our inquiry from science to
wishful thinking or perhaps even religion.
The most startling revelation of all may be
that social scientists have not conducted
any tests to determine if these sizable genetic variations from group to group have
any behavioral implications.
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Conclusion

Summary Points

If understanding of politics is to advance, the grip of environmental determinism must be loosened, and appreciation of
the role of biology must extend beyond
think pieces and “calls to arms.” Serious
empirical research on the interaction of biological and environmental independent
variables needs to become the order of the
day. Recent work in cognitive psychology,
neuroscience, experimental economics,
and behavior genetics serves as a valuable
guide for the manner in which empirical
biopolitics should be conducted. This article has given the most attention to behavior genetics because momentum is building in this area and because its data and
research methodologies are of a sort that is
familiar to many political scientists.
The implications of a possible role for
genetics in accounting for variance in political attitudes and behaviors across individuals and groups may seem disquieting, but acknowledging a role for genetics
does not equate with intolerance. In fact,
admitting that behavioral traits are partially genetic may lead to a more tolerant
world. Those who accept the growing evidence that sexual orientation is influenced
by both genetics and prenatal environment
are generally more accepting of homosexuality than those who are convinced sexual orientation is entirely determined by
postnatal environmental forces (and therefore can be reprogrammed in boot camps).
The same can be said for politics. Accepting that those who differ from us politically are not being willfully bullheaded
but may have a genetic predisposition toward beliefs contrary to ours may take the
edge off of the overheated political debate
that characterizes conflicts between the left
and the right. People understandably may
not want to give up hope that their political opponents can someday be turned from
the dark side, but it still might be useful to
recognize that certain individuals are genetically predisposed toward certain political orientations.

1. Twin studies offer a way to assess the
extent to which genes are relevant to a
trait.
2. Personal temperament is shaped by
both genetic and environmental forces.
3. Political temperament is shaped by
both genetic and environmental forces.
4. Political temperament may be a function of personal temperament but it
also seems to have unique components.
5. Political scientists tend to know little
about modern genetics and to ignore
the genetic basis of political attitudes.
6. It is possible and desirable for political
scientists to work with geneticists and
to learn their techniques.
7. Incorporating genetics into the study
of social behavior is the wave of the future for the social sciences.

Future Directions
1. Twin studies with better data on political variables.
2. Twin studies of social behavior such as
decisions in economic games.
3. Adoption studies involving political
variables and adult adoptees.
4. Association studies in which specific
genetic alleles are checked for association with particular political traits.
5. Comparing and contrasting personal
and political temperaments.
6. Identifying the biological/neural systems relevant to political thinking.
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